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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MILAN MACK BOYCE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________________________ ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 16342 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third 
District Court denying Appellant's Motion to set aside the 
Decree of Divorce entered after the Court reviewed and accept-
ed the settlement agreement of the parties. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, the Honorable David B. Dee 
presiding, after hearing the motion of the Appellant submitted 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the U.R.C.P. to set aside the Decree 
of Divorce which he had made and entered after reviewing and 
accepting the stipulation of the parties, denied said motion 
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and ordered Appellant to remove a Notice of Lis Pendens she had 
filed against property awarded to Respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation by this Court of the Order 
of the District Court entered January 31, 1979. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the Appellant submitted argument in place of a 
statement of facts, the Respondent hereby submits the following 
as the statement of facts in this case. 
On May 27, 1977, the Appellant, Nina Doreen Davis 
Boyce, filed a C:omrlaint for divorce against the Respondent, 
Milan Mack Boyce (R. 2). As part of her action, Appellant had th 
Court issue an Order requiring Respondent to make a full accounti 
of his assets on July 27, 1977 (R. 10). 
On August l, 1977, Respondent filed an Answer to 
Appellant's Complaint (R. 7). A hearing was thereafter set for 
September 27, 1977 to consider the matters requiring resolution 
pending final judgment. At the September 27 hearing before Judge 
David K. Winder, the Respondent testified that he owned a small 
interest in Insul-Guard Corporation; that he was paid a salary b., 
Insul-Guard Corporation and had been paid a salary by Insul-Do~ 
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Corporation; that he was the president of Insul-Guard; that he 
had insurance benefits coming in from his efforts as an insurance 
agent; that he owned real property at 8457 Top of the World 
Drive, and at 1295 East 4800 South; that he owned ten 10 1/2 acre 
lots of Dimple Dell Oaks Subdivision which he estimated was worth 
in excess of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00); 
that Insulation Corporation of America, Insul-Down, and Insul-
Guard owned several pieces of realty which he itemized in his 
testimony; and he testified regarding the balance of his checking 
accounts and other miscellaneous items of property (transcript of 
hearing of September 27, 1977). As a result of this hearing, 
Respondent was ordered to pay Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) a 
month temporary support, to allow Appellant the use of an auto-
mobile and to maintain a policy of health insurance for the 
benefit of the minor children (R. 263). 
On December 5, 1977, Appellant filed a Motion for Order 
Compelling Further Discovery or in the alternative, for Entry of 
Default Judgment (R. 46-47). Said motion was heard on December 
21, 1977 and Respondent was ordered to answer the Interrogatories 
propounded by Appellant on or before January 11, 1978, or suffer 
his Answer to be stricken and his default entered (R. 265 et 
seq.). 
On December 22, 1977, the case was set for trial on 
February 7, 1978 before Judge Dee. On January 16, 1978, Respon-
-3-
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dent's Answer was st~icken and his default entered (R. 53). On 
January 31, 1978, Appellant filed a Notice of Default Hearing 
which hearing was to be held on February 1, 1978, before Judge 
Marcellus K. Snow (R. 54). On February 1, 1978, Respondent filed 
a Motion to Vacate Default (R. 55). As grounds for his Motion, 
Respondent submitted a medical statement with his Motion stating 
that he had been ill and that his illness had caused him to be 
late in responding to discovery (R. 55-58). Respondent's Answers 
to Appellant's written interrogatories was filed on February 1, 
1978 (R. 60-89). On February 1, Judge Snow granted Respondent's 
Motion to Set Aside Jefault (R. 59). 
On Februar/- i:S, 1978, Mr. Gayle Dean Hunt withdrew as 
counsel for Respondent and Jed W. Shields became counsel for 
Respondent (R. 736). 
By Order of Judge Dee filed March 22, 1978, Respondent 
was ordered to supply more complete answers to the Interrogator· 
ies of Appellant, said answers to be and were submitted by Harch 
24, 1978 (R. 101). 
On April 7, 1978, the divorce was granted after a 
settlement reached between Appellant and Respondent was read into 
the record (R. 231 et seq.). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Decree of Divorce were filed by Appellant's counsel on 
May 19, 1978 (R. 104-121). On June 20, 1978, a Motion and Order 
-4-
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were presented by Appellant's counsel to Judge Dee which recited 
that the Findings and Decree entered on May 19, 1978 were errone-
ously entered (R. 122-123) and new Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were entered on June 22, 
1978 (R. 124-132). 
Mr. Gary A. Sargent withdrew as counsel for the Appel-
lant and David A. Goodwill became counsel for Appellant (R. 735). 
On July 20, 1978, Appellant filed 1) a Motion for 
Relief from Final Decree pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the U.C.R.P., 
2) a Notice of Lis Pendens against the realty that had been 
awarded to the Respondent, and 3) a Notice of Appeal alleging that 
she had obtained material and relevant information regarding the 
real property of the parties which could not have been disovered 
by due diligence in time to move for new trial, that Defendant, 
Milan Mack Boyce, had been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, or 
misconduct in relation to the divorce action, and that she had 
entered into the stipulation for settlement while under duress 
(R. 216). 
On July 27, 1978, Respondent filed a Motion to Require 
Plaintiff to remove her lis pendens (R. 153). Pursuant to a 
Motion for Special Setting filed by Respondent (R. 155), the 
matter was heard August 1, 1978 (R. 735 et seq.). By Minute of 
Entry of August 1, 1978, Judge Dee ordered all real property and 
-5-
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cash to be restored as they were on April 7, 1978 (R. 162). 
Appellant's counsel drew up an order reflecting the Court's 
August l, 1978 decision. 
On August 17, Mr. David A. Goodwill withdrew as counsel 
for the Appellant, and Mr. R. M. Child entered his appearance as 
counsel for the Appellant. 
On August 21, 1978, the Respondent filed an Objection 
to the Order requiring the restoration of the property and money 
based on Respondent's previous irrevocable disposition of some of 
the property in order to raise the necessary funds to satisfy the 
demands of the Decree of Divorce imposed on the Respondent (R. 
279-281). In support of the Objection, Respondent filed his 
"Petition to Set As::_de the Temporary Order of the Court and to 
Restore the Decree of Divorce Herein", explaining the dispositions 
of the property and the consequent impossibility of compliance 
with the Order (R. 307-335). 
Thereafter, a hearing on the various pending motions 
was held on September 8, 1978. At that hearing, Judge Dee 
related to counsel a conversation he had with the Chief Justice 
of this Court in which he was told that the filing of the Notice 
of Appeal had stripped the trial court of the jurisdiction necess· 
ary to make the August 1, 1978 decision (R. 773). Judge Dee con· 
sequently refused to sign the Order drawn by Appellant's counsel 
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(R. 221) and Judge Dee directed Respondent's counsel to prepare 
an Order vacating the August 1, 1978 decision (R. 789). Judge 
Dee also ruled the matter was open for additional discovery upon 
the withdrawal of the Notice of Appeal so that he would have 
facts adequate to decide whether the Court should grant the Rule 
60(b) motion (R. 787-788). 
On September 20, 1978, Appellant's Appeal #15958 to 
this court wab dismissed at Appellant's request (R. 277). 
On October 5, 1978, Judge Dee signed Respondent's Order 
Vacating the Order of August 1, 1978, and he concurrently initial-
led the Appellant's Order as not signed (R. 336-341). 
On October 10, 1978, a hearing was set for October 17, 
1978 (R. 342). 
On October 17, 1978, a full evidentiary hearing was 
held; Appellant called several witnesses, examined those witnesses 
and proffered evidence in an attempt to prove the allegations of 
fraud set out in her Motion. Appellant indicated at the hearing 
that she had received a sheet of paper through her attorney a few 
days prior to the April 7, 1978 stipulation date, which sheet of 
paper contained the answers as compelled by the March 22, 1979 
Order (R. 212, R. 803, and Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). The Court 
ruled that the Appellant failed to prove the allegations of fraud 
(which she admits on page 30 of her brief) (R. 527-530), after a 
-7-
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full and complete opportunity to do so was afforded her (R.792-
891). Appellant then filed her Notice of Appeal (R. 661). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
NO FRAUD WAS PERPETRATED ON THE APPELLANT BY THE 
RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED A FULL OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE 
SUCH AVERMENTS AND FAILED TO DO SO. 
The parties in this matter entered into a stipulated 
divorce. Appellant now seeks to set aside her agreement and the 
Decree entered pursuant to that agreement insisting that the 
Respondent perpetrated fraud upon her by hiding and otherwise 
misrepresenting hi~ dssets, thus depriving her of the ability to 
present the full extent of such assets to the Court and causing 
her to enter into an unfair Property Settlement. The trial court 
correctly determined that no fraud had been perpetrated and that 
the Appellant had a full and complete opportunity to present her 
evidence in support of her Rule 60(b) Motion and failed to prove 
her averments. When the trial court, after hearing determines 
that an Appellant failed to establish grounds justifying setting 
aside a judgment, this court has ruled it should not disturb that 
ruling absent of a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial judge. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. , 123 U. 416, 260 P. 2d 74i 
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(1953). In setting out this rule, this Court declared that the 
key consideration is that the parties should be given an oppor-
tunity to present their position to the Court. 123 Utah at 419-
420. As this Court stated in Warren: 
"The Rule that the Courts will incline 
toward granting relief to a party who has not 
had the opportunity to present his case is 
ordinarily applied at the trial court level, 
and this Court will not reverse the trial 
court where it appears that all elements were 
considered, merely because the Motion could 
have been granted. The Supreme Court will 
not substitute its discretion for that of the 
trial court." Id., at 744. 
In this case Appellant had her day in Court (two of 
them, first on April 7, 1978 at the time of the stipulated settle-
ment and again a second time on October 17, 1978) and now attempts 
to retry the facts, not the law here. That is something this 
court can do but does not do on the facts because of the great 
deference given to the trial court's advantage in being in close 
proximity to the parties and the witnesses during the trial. 
Richins v. Struhs, 17 U. 2d 356, 358, 412 P.2d 314 (1966). 
This Court has considered precisely the issues pre-
sented in this matter in Haner v. Haner, 13 U. 2d 299, 373 P.2d 
577 (1962) where an appeal was taken from an order denying a 
Motion to Set Aside or Modify Divorce Decree. The Hotion was 
based on allegation that Respondent had introduced evidence of 
fraudulent values on some of the properties which were subject to 
-9-
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property settlement. In affirming the trial court, this Court 
ruled: 
"In order to justify granting relief, 
the alleged wrong would have to be of the 
type characterized as extrinsic fraud: that 
is, fraud based on conduct or activities 
outside the court proceedings themselves; and 
which is designed and has the effect of 
depriving the other party of the opportunity 
to present his claim or defense." 13 Utah 2d 
at 301. 
This is not the type of fraud being pleaded in the 
instant case by the Appellant. Appellant's position is that the 
Respondent deliberately understated and denied ownership of 
certain properties in his answers to interrogatories and affi-
davits (see Appellant's Brief, "Statement of Facts"), all of 
which could have been or were presented to the Court at the time 
of the April 7, 1978 stipulation and could have been challenged 
by the Appellant in the Court proceedings. In fact, they were 
subject to just such scrutiny in the hearing held October 17, 
1978. This Court stated in Haner in regard to this type of 
appeal: 
"It is obvious that quite a different 
situation exists where there is no prevention 
of the party from contesting the issues in a 
trial, and where the complaint is simply that 
one party presented perjured testimony or 
false evidence. This charge is simply a 
continuation of the same dispute which the 
trial was supposed to resolve. It is the 
purpose of the law to afford parties full 
opportunity to have themselves and their 
-10-
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witnesses present; and to present their 
evidence and their contentions to the Court. 
When this has been done and the Court has 
made its determination, that should end the 
matter, except for the right of appeal. It 
is so patent as to hardly justify comment 
that a judgment should not be set aside 
merely to grant the losing party another 
chance to accomplish the task at which he 
just failed; to prove that he was right and 
that the opponent was wrong. To reopen a 
case just because a party persists in assert-
ing and attempting to prove that his version 
of the dispute was the truth and that of the 
opponent was false would open the door to a 
repetition of that procedure, whoever won the 
next time; and thus to keeping the dispute 
going ad infinitum with no way of determining 
when the merry-go-round of the law suit would 
end. This would involve not only a waste of 
time, energy, and expense but also would 
result in such uncertainty as to people's 
rights that the very purpose of a law suit, 
the settling of disputes and putting them at 
rest, would be defeated. Resort to the 
Courts would be frustrating and impracticable 
unless there were some point at which decisions 
became final so that parties could place 
reliance thereon, leave their troubles behind 
and proceed to the future. It is for these 
reasons that Courts accord to judgments 
regularly entered a high degree of sanctity; 
and would overturn a judgment such as the 
instant one on the ground of fraud only if it 
were shown that the complaining party had 
been wrongfully deprived of the opportunity 
to meet and contest the issues at trial." 13 
Utah 2d at 301-302. 
The Appellant had her day in Court, in which she had a 
full opportunity to present evidence to support her accusations 
of fraud. She simply failed to prove those accusations. She 
asserts that the trial court made its decision based on affidavits 
-11-
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rather than testimony but that is not true. From the record it 
is obvious Judge Dee did not rely on the Respondent's Affidavit 
in reaching his decision because at the end of the October 17, 
1978, fraud hearing he indicated that he already had a feeling 
for whether or not the Appellant had met her burden of proof in 
the matter, based on the testimony presented at the hearing (R. 
887-888). She had the opportunity to present evidence on October 
17, 1978 and simply failed to prove her case. She now seeks to 
try it one more time before this Court. 
It is interesting to note that the Appellant in her 
brief admits that she failed to meet her burden of proof: 
"The October 17 Hearing was not intended 
to, and it did not, amount to formal proof of 
common law frau~ (emphasis added) (page 
30). 
Respondent is in full agreement with the Appellant that the 
hearing did not result in proof of fraud, but the Appellant is 
gravely mistaken if she is under the impression that the October 
17, 1978 hearing was not intended as evidentiary in character, 
fully intended to allow her a full opportunity to prove the 
averments of her Motion. Judge Dee, during the hearing which 
preceded the October 17, 1978 hearing, characterized that hearing 
as a full evidentiary hearing (R. 779) and put Appellant on 
notice that the October 17, 1978 hearing was indeed the occasion 
to present proof of her allegations of fraud (R. 779 et seq.). 
-12-
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Appellant also takes the position that Judge Dee "gave 
the impression" at the September 8, 1978 hearing that Appellant 
could not proceed with any discovery prior to the October 17, 
1978 hearing. Appellant attempts to persuade this Court that 
such was the case by including selected portions of the record of 
the September 8, 1978 hearing in the appendix to her brief, 
evidently to excuse her failure to prove her allegations of 
fraud. If Appellant would have read the remainder of the record 
of the September 8, 1978 hearing, she would have discovered that 
Judge Dee took quite the opposite position: 
"THE COURT: . but if there is an 
indication that at the time the Decree was 
entered the person who entered into a Stipu-
lation on the basis of which the Decree was 
issued was acting under a mistake of fact or 
surprise or with some kind of excusable 
neglect or there was some misrepresentation 
or fraud, the Court will exercise jurisdiction 
as a Court of equity, to look into those 
problems. And the only way I am going to 
get information which will be a basis on 
which I can decide whether or not the Court 
has made a mistake in entering that Decree is 
to allow the defendant and the plaintiff 
broad opportunities to take what other steps 
the need to take to im lement their discover 
Depositions, emand or production o ocuments, 
whatever you need to take, whatever steps you 
need to take in order that the Court can 
properly have all of the facts. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
And now I'm opening it~ for the 
purpose of;giving you gentlemen the opportunity 
to advise me as to what property is involved 
-13-
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and how it should be divided, and that's got 
to be the way to go. (emphasis added). 
R.787-788. 
The above-quoted statement of the Court shows not only 
did the Court not "give the impression" that discovery was 
blocked, Judge Dee directly stated the opposite. How Appellant 
arrived at the "impression" that discovery was blocked by the 
Court is a virtual mystery to the Respondent. 
A reading of the record will also reveal that all of 
the issues which the Appellant raises in relation to her alle-
gations of fraud were "tried or triable" in the lower court 
proceedings in the fashion contemplated under the authority of 
Haner v. Haner, supra. For the purposes of clarity of explanation 
each property alleged:.~; ?'.lt out of Appellant's reach by the 
alleged fraud will be listed and responded to respectively: 
1. The Transfer of the Corporations to Mr. and Mrs. 
Milan C. Boyce, Respondent's Parents: Appellant alleges that the 
Respondent transferred certain corporations which he allegedly 
"owned" to his parents without her knowledge, causing her to 
enter into a stipulation awarding her less than that to which she 
was entitled. 
Mrs. Boyce, the Appellant, was in fact fully apprised 
of the ownership or lack thereof in said corporations (R. 821-
825). She was aware of the financial statement submitted by the 
-14-
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Respondent to Zions First National Bank and Respondent's Answers 
to Interrogatories, which were submitted to Appellant prior to the 
April 7, 1978 Stipulation (R. 60-89). In paragraph twelve (12) 
of her Affidavit of January 22, 1979, entitled "Affidavit of Nina 
Doreen Davis Boyce In Response to Defendant's Answer and Counter 
Affidavit", Appellant states that she knew of the transfer of the 
corporations prior to the April 7, 1978 hearing wherein the 
stipulation was entered (R. 571-584). 
Appellant was afforded and took a full opportunity to 
try, contest, and offer proof regarding the alleged fraud involved 
in the corporate transfers (R. 829 et seq.). Since no fraud 
occurred, she was unable to prove any. 
"Fraud" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth 
Edition, as "concealment of that which should have been disclosed 
which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he 
should act upon it to his legal injury." In light of the fact 
that Appellant admitted under oath that she was fully apprised of 
the transfers, no claim of fraud can be based on these acts. 
2. Respondent's Statement of Value Regarding the 
Dimple Dell Oaks Subdivision Property: Appellant alleges that 
the Respondent defrauded her by presenting a certified MAl 
appraisal stating the value of the Dimple Dell Oaks property as 
Forty Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($46,500) when in fact it 
-15-
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was worth in excess of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,0: 
(R. 255 See also R. 66). 
To say that the Respondent attempted to defraud the 
Appellant in the fashion alleged shows an absolute and total 
disregard of the record. In the September 27, 1977 hearing, 
Respondent himself stated under oath that the property was worth, 
in his opinion, in excess of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($150,000) (R. 255 and R. 66). Further, in a financial statement 
given to Appellant in response to interrogatories, Respondent 
valued the Dimple Dell property at $175,000.00 (R. 79). 
The Forty Six Thousand Five Hundred ($46,500) Dollar 
figure was a net val.::.1e figure that was calculated by a certified 
appraiser. See rlau,uff's Exhibit 4. Apparently, Appellant is 
not able to distinguish between market value and net value/equity 
after required improvements, a critical distinction when the net 
asset value of real property is in question. Respondent's state· 
ments of the market value of the property were entered into the 
record prior to the April 7, 1978 Stipulation and thus served to 
inform Appellant of Respondent's perception of the value of the 
property. Appellant was afforded and took a full opportunity to 
try, contest, and offer proof of this allegation, her evidence 
failed and the Trial Court correctly rejected her claim (R. 255 
et seq. R. 841 et seq.) 
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3. Parties Residence at Top of the World Drive. 
Prior to the April 7, 1978 stipulation, the parties sold this 
property in a bona fide sale to an unrelated third party for One 
Hundred Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars (R. 443), which fairly and 
accurately established the fair market value of this property. 
This sale established that Appellant's claims regarding any other 
representation of value is without merit. If other evidence 
existed it has not been presented by Appellant. 
4. Liens in Favor of American Concrete Construction, 
Inc. Appellant knew of said liens prior to the April 7, 1978 
stipulation (R. 66). Said liens did not evaporate as claimed by 
the Appellant. The liens for labor and materials were (after the 
stipulation of April 7, 1978) traded for land the Respondent was 
awarded in the settlement. The Appellant was informed of this 
prior to the October 17, 1978 hearing (R. 328-329). Since there 
was no fraud involved, Appellant failed to prove it occurred. 
5. The Higher Valuation Placed on the 1295 East 
4800 South Property. Appellant alleges as fraud the fact that 
the Respondent's family gave a higher value for this property in 
the Lockhart financial statement of May l, 1978 than Respondent 
had previously given prior to the stipulation. This is true 
but the higher valuation was given because of a zoning change and 
sale of a neighbors property after the zoning change caused a 
rise in the value of that similar property. Even the application 
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(R. 439) for the said zoning change was not filed by the neighbor· 
ing owner until after the April 7th 1978 stipulation. The zoning 
change and its subsequent windfall to the Respondent's family 
was completely beyond the Respondent's control and certainly 
nothing the Respondent knew of or withheld from the Appellant 
who was as able as was the Respondent or his family to learn of 
these events (R. 435-440 See also R. 316-318). 
6. Sale of the Red, Inc. Partnership Interest in the 
Highland Drive Property to May V. Boen: In answer to Appellant's 
Interrogatories, Respondent described the complete status of this 
property to the Appellant prior to the April 7, 1978 stipulation 
(R. 212 See also B E7 Appellant later tried to contend that 
Respondent fraudulently transferred the interest in this property 
allegedly purchased by the Respondent (in his capacity as Presi-
dent of Insul-Guard Corporation) and a Dr. Tarbet. May V. Boen 
testified that this was a bona fide purchase and sale between 
herself and the Insul-Guard Corporation (R. 883-884) . She made 
the purchase with her own money (contrary to Appellant's asser-
tions). 
Appellant did not prove any attempts by the Respondent 
to conceal the sale from the Appellant (R. 861 et seq.). In fact 
Dr. Tarbet testified that the transactions were discussed with 
the Appelant (R. 851). 
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Thus Appellant was afforded and took a full opportunity 
to contest, try and offer proof of the allegation of fraud in 
this respect and her evidence did not support her assertion. 
7. The Lockhart Company Financial Statement of May 
l, 1978: Appellant alleges that the Respondent represented at 
the lower court proceedings that he had no interest in the cor-
porations heretofore described (due to the transfer of the same 
to his parents). But asserted that after those proceedings, he 
applied for a loan at The Lockhart Company telling them in his 
consolidated family financial statement that he owned the cor-
porations. Appellant asserts this as evidence of fraudulent 
concealment. 
Appellant was afforded and took a full opportunity to 
try, contest, and offer proof of this allegation. Respondent 
contended and does now contend that the assets listed on the 
Lockhart financial statement were family assets, not personal 
assets. This was discussed with and understood by the Lockhart 
Company's loan officer, Thomas G. Pike. Mr. Pike testified that 
there had been a discussion of family assets being pledged as 
security for the loan (R. 841). The heading on one of the pages 
of the financial statement plainly states that the assets thereon 
belong to the Respondent's Aunt, May V. Boen (R. 208 and plain-
tiff's Exhibit 8) and there is in the statement a summary page 
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showing the summary of family assets being consolidated into the 
statement (R. 204 and plaintiff's Exhibit 8). 
Further this Lockhart financial statement was exactly 
the same kind of consolidated family financial statement (even as 
to layout and format) as was given to the Appellant in answers to 
interrogatories before the April 7, 1978 stipulation (R. 78-89) 
and Defendant's Exhibit 7). The Trial Court correctly concluded 
that Appellant had ample opportunity to examine all of this 
information and this being true she had failed to prove to the 
satisfaction of the Court that there was any fraud involved (R. 
837 et seq.). 
In sum tiie <"<ppellant' s contentions are defeated by the 
record as it existed prior to the April 7, 1978 stipulation. 
The Appellant was given every opportunity to conduct discovery 
and present her evidence to the trial court. She did so and 
failed to prove her contentions. She is now attempting to retry 
the case in this Court in order to have a third chance to succeed 
in proving what she twice failed to prove at the trial court 
level. This is contrary to this Court's position regarding 
appeals of this nature. It should be treated accordingly 
and this Court should affirm Judge Dee's ruling. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER TO APPELLANT TO REMOVE THE LIS 
PENDENS IS A MOOT ISSUE UPON APPEAL. 
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Courts are without power to decide questions that can-
not affect the rights of litigants before them. Doremus v. Board 
of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). The Courts do not sit to 
decide arguments after events have put them to rest. North 
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, (1971). 
The lis pendens issue raised by the Appellant is such 
an issue. If, arguendo, Judge Dee's decision is reversed and 
remanded, the lis pendens would not need be removed since a trial 
de novo would be set. If Judge Dee is sustained, his Order would 
stand and the lis pendens must be removed as the litigation would 
be terminated. 
A decision of this Court on the issue of the lis 
pendens would not affect any of the rights of the parties and is 
a false issue which should be disregarded. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, represented by able counsel, had her day in 
court. Now after the demands have been met, she seeks vacation 
of the Decree which awarded $100,000.00 cash and other valuable 
assets to her. She wants more but the trial court denied Appel-
lant's motions to set aside her own agreement and the Order based 
thereon after giving her a full and fair opportunity to show she 
had been defrauded. This Court should affirm that ruling. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
243~ast Fourth South 
®:tte 300, Upper Level 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
79 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
:t:?II?ICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered copies 
of the foregoing Respondent Is Brief' on this rs'"'-f:' day of 
July, 1979, to the following: 
R. M. Child, Esq. 
DONOVAN C. SNYDER, Esq. 
Bayle, Child & Ritchie 
1105 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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